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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of differing U. S. Farm Policy regimes on the stock 
prices of publicly traded agribusinesses. Following the Roll and Ross approach, we apply a two 
step Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM). We analyze the effect of agricultural policy on returns to 
agribusiness by applying a modified APM to agricultural returns to test for the presence of an 
agribusiness premium or discount. We further augment our analysis by dividing the sample into 
two  time  periods  around  the  implementation  of  the  1996.  The  differences  in  agribusiness 
premium can then be tested using a paired t-test. The empirical evidence lends support to a 
switch  from  negative  returns  to  agribusiness  stocks  pre-FAIR  Act  to  positive  returns  to 
agribusiness stocks after its enactment.  
 
Using APT to Assess the Impact of Farm Policy on Agribusiness Stocks 
U.S. farm policy has changed over time, often setting objectives related to the production sector 
of this broad industry. U.S. farm policy has traditionally been shaped by the goals of a consistent 
food supply and has often provided income support to farmers in times of low commodity prices. 
Domestic farm policy, directly affects the financial and risk characteristics of farmers. One of the 
most compelling examples of this linkage may be found in the enactment of the Payment in Kind 
(PIK)  program.  Zulauf,  Guither,  and  Henderson  (1985)  note  that  while  the  PIK  program 
provided  income  to  farmers  benefiting  rural  communities  it  hurt  agribusinesses  by  reducing 
business volume. While this example is extreme, other policies such as program set-asides, the 
substitution  of  Agricultural  Marketing  Transition  Act  payments  for  Deficiency  Payments  in 
1995,  and  Loan  Deficiency  Payments  each  have  different  implications  for  agricultural  input 
demand and output supply. This secondary impact should be considered in the discussions of the 
2007 Farm Bill. 2 
 
It is of interest to investors and managers of agribusiness firms the impact farm policy 
has on input suppliers and output processors. In particular, the farm policies influence production 
levels and as a result influence the demand for production inputs. Furthermore, guaranteed price 
supports  influence the prices  buyers of producers’ outputs  pay  (Schmitz, Furtan, and  Baylis 
2002). As a result, these farm policies should influence the value of firms that are engaged in 
operations that supply to or buy from agricultural producers. Different policy regimes should 
have differing impacts depending on their influence on production quantities and prices.   
Changes in firms’ values will likely only occur with substantial shifts in government 
policies that influence their returns. The farm policy debate that occurred in 1995 and resulted in 
the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act was widely viewed a dramatic shift 
in U.S. farm policy (Paarlberg and Orden 1996). Due to changes in the political environment in 
the legislative branch (the Republican Party captured majorities in both the House and the Senate 
for the first time in 40 years) and rising market prices in the mid-1990s, farm policy made a shift 
to decoupling government payments from production decisions. Though Paarlberg and Orden 
speculate on the differences in policy that would have occurred without changes in political party 
majorities or run-ups in agricultural commodity market prices, there is no empirical analysis of 
these policy changes on agribusiness values.  
The similarities in the lead-up to the 2007 farm bill and the 1996 farm bill are striking. 
The 2006 elections saw the majority return to the Democratic Party in both chambers and again 
there  is  a  substantial  run-up  in  the  price  of  agricultural  commodities. As  a  result,  a  careful 
analysis  might  help  to  inform  the  debate  on  agricultural  policy  during  this  2007  year.  In  a 
summary  of  farm  bill  forums  sponsored  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Secretary 
Johanns has identified more than 40 broad areas for discussion during the 2007 debate including 3 
 
agricultural  concentration,  farm  family  income,  farm  safety  net,  and  federal  crop  insurance. 
These are among the issues that will impact agribusiness firm values most directly. The results of 
this  study will serve to  inform  agricultural  policy makers,  assist  agribusinesses  managers in 
understanding the impact of various policy regimes, and contribute to the understanding of the 
consequences of policy on the financial success of firms.   
This  study  examines  whether  changes  in  agricultural  policies  affect  the  return  on 
agribusiness stocks after adjusting for relative risk using the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM) 
proposed by Roll and Ross (1980). Changes in agricultural policy affect not only farmers, but 
also  rural  communities  and  associated  industries.  The  passage  of  the  Federal  Agricultural 
Improvement  and  Reform  (FAIR)  Act  of  1996  provided  Agricultural  Marketing  Transition 
Payments (AMTPs) which were largely fixed based on past program participation. This was an 
attempt to decouple agricultural policy (Paarlberg and Orden 1996) to reduce the distortions in 
production incentives. This study examines whether the implementation of FAIR yielded a non-
systematic shift in returns to agribusinesses. 
We  analyze  the  effect  of  agricultural  policy  on  returns  to  agribusiness  by  applying  a 
modified APM to agricultural returns to test for the presence of an agribusiness premium or 
discount. We further augment our analysis by dividing the sample into two time periods around 
the implementation of the 1996. The differences in agribusiness premium can then be tested 
using a paired t-test. 
Arbitrage Pricing Model 
Roll and Ross (1980) derive an empirical implementation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
proposed by Ross (1976). Ross’s insight in the development of the APT was that in equilibrium 
it would be impossible to buy and sell assets (stocks) without adding more capital in a way that 4 
 
would yield a riskless profit. His formulation is largely based on a factor model of asset returns. 
Specifically,  the  vector  of  returns  on  assets  are  hypothesized  to  be  driven  by  a  number  of 
common economic factors affecting the economy 
t t t t r E f                           (1) 
where  t r  is a vector ( 1 tN rM) of  N  returns on assets in period t,  t E  is a vector ( 1 tN EM) 
expected returns on those assets,   is a matrix ( Nk M ) of factor loading,  t f  is a vector  
( 1 tk fM )  of common factors, and  t  is a vector ( 1 tN M ) of idiosyncratic variation. Given 
the factor representation of asset returns in Equation 1 and the efficiency conditions specified by 
Ross, the expected returns must be linear functions of the common factors 
0 EE                            (2) 
where  0 E  can be interpreted as the risk-free rate of return (or zero-beta rate of return) and   is a 
vector ( 1 k M ) of constants. 
The implementation of the APT is largely dependent on the specification of the common 
factors and estimation of the factor loadings. The literature supports two approaches. First, Roll 
and Ross suggest estimating the factor loadings by treating the factors as unobservable and using 
confirmatory factor analysis (Bollen 1989). The alternative approach developed in Chen, Roll, 
and Ross (1986) is to directly specify proxies for the latent factors. In this study, we apply the 
confirmatory factor analysis approach suggested by Roll and Ross. 
The variance matrix ( ) implied by the factor model presented in Equation 1 becomes 
                           (3) 
where   is a diagonal matrix ( kk M ) variances of the common factors and   is a diagonal 
matrix ( NN M ) of idiosyncratic variances. For simplicity, we set   to the identity matrix. 5 
 




max ln L tr S                    (4) 
where  . tr  is the trace operator and S  is the sample variance matrix. Given the estimated vector 
of factor loadings,   can be estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ r                         (5) 
where  ˆ  is the vector ( ( 1) 1 ˆ
k M ) of estimated risk-free return and risk premia,    is matrix of 
estimated factor loadings augmented with a vector of ones to estimate the risk-free rate of return, 
ˆ  is the estimated matrix of factor loadings,  ˆ  is the estimated matrix of idiosyncratic risk, and 
r  is  the  vector  ( 1 N rM) of average returns for the assets. To test for the presence of an 
agribusiness premia or discount, we append an additional dummy variable vector to    which 
takes on the value of one if the stock is an agribusiness asset and zero otherwise. Further, we 
consider two different regimes by estimating a the factor loading matrices and risk premia for the 
period between January 1986 and December 1995 and a second for the period between January 
1996 and December 2006. 
Data 
The data used in this study are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
accessed through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We divided the set of all stocks 
active in December 2006 into those stocks with SIC codes that were agricultural or agribusiness 
(including production agriculture, processing, and sales) and those which were not primarily 6 
 
associated with agriculture. We then drew randomly from this separation to get 8 agribusiness 
stocks and 24 non-agribusiness stocks. A list of the stocks used is presented in Table 1. 
Results 
The estimated risk-free return and risk premia for each time period are presented in Table 2. 
Given  that  the  exclusion  of  a  significant  common  factor  tends  to  bias  any  estimated  non-
systematic  premia  downward,  we  have  over-fit  the  common  factor  model  allowing  for  five 
common factors in each time period. Unlike the results of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
analysis of the estimated risk premia requires some finesse. Specifically, the common factor 
model presented in Equation 3 implies squaring of each estimated factor loading. Thus, each 
factor is invariant to sign (i.e., multiplying any factor by -1 changes the interpretation of the 
factor, but not its significance). Thus, the estimates of the full sample imply the presence of four 
significant common factors, with one significant common factor in the sample before 1996 and 
three significant common factors in the post-FAIR sample. For our purposes here, the important 
factor is that each factor model is overspecified (i.e., a statistically significant agribusiness effect 
could not simply be a manifestation of an excluded common factor). 
Next, we introduce a dummy variable into each regression to test for an agribusiness effect. 
The results for each individual sample are rather unimpressive. Across the whole sample, we 
reject  the  significance  of  the  agribusiness  affect  at  any  conventional  level  of  confidence. 
Similarly, we reject the significance of the agribusiness effect in the sample before FAIR. Also, 
we would fail to reject the significance of the agribusiness effect in the later sample for only the 
most tolerant confidence levels. However, the split sample does produce some support for the 
change in agribusiness effects. Specifically, the estimated effect of the agribusiness stocks in the 
period before FAIR is negative while the same effect shifts to a positive in the years since the 7 
 
implementation of FAIR. The paired t-test for an equality of the two effects is -1.8628 which is 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. Hence, the effect of agribusiness may be 
averaged out between regimes. 
Discussion and Implications 
The goal of the 1996 FAIR Act was to decouple payments from production decisions, i.e. reduce 
the impact of the government subsidy on over production of some agricultural goods. If indeed 
agriculture input suppliers had been  benefitting  from  overproduction through farmers use of 
additional agricultural inputs, then one would have anticipated the agribusiness effect post FAIR 
to be negative. This is also true for food processors that may have been paying lower market 
prices for overproduced agricultural commodities. Yet, the results indicate that the FAIR Act had 
the opposite impact. This is not completely unexpected when one considers that indeed many 
agribusinesses had been lobbying in favor of the FAIR Act policies (Schertz and Doering 1999).  
One possible reason for this improvement in returns to agribusiness stocks post-FAIR 
could be related to the exit of high-cost marginal farmers either through retirement or lack of 
competitiveness in the market, a speculative scenario posited by Paarlberg and Orden. Input 
suppliers  in  particular  may  have  benefitted  from  a  replacement  of  many  small,  inefficient 
producers with a few, very-large producers. Paarlberg and Orden suggested that this scenario 
was unlikely because it was contingent upon an unprecedented run of high and/or stable market 
commodity prices. Indeed the period between the FAIR Act and the 2002 Farm Bill saw the 
USDA make emergency relief payments in excess of $26 billion (Westcott, Young, and Price 
2002).  
This  replacement  of  smaller  farms  with  larger  operations  could  lend  other  additional 
efficiencies in the supply chain. Processors might be able to source a consistent supply easier by 8 
 
working  with  one  large  supplier  rather  than  using  a  market  composed  of  many  smaller 
operations. It also could potentially have reflected a shift in acreage to less heavily subsidized 
agricultural  commodities  that  are  of  greater  value,  viz.  fruits  and  vegetables.  Having  these 
products available at lower prices may have buoyed processor profits more than the negative 
impact of rising row crop commodities.  
The  non-systematic  components  of  the  model  are  much  larger  than  anticipated.  This 
problem potentially could be resolved by defining the common factors a priori (Chen, Roll, and 
Ross 1986). This approach could potentially yield an improved model if several common factors 
shared by many industries and agricultural suppliers and processors could be identified. It is also 
possible  that  the  regime  switch  pre-1996  and  post-1996  is  more  closely  related  to  the 
overvaluation of technology stocks in the late-1990s than to that of a change in agricultural 
policy. It is possible that investors, weary of the high risks associated with these technology 
stocks, sought to invest in safer food and agribusiness firms.  
In addition, it seems that food processors are over represented in the sample and input 
suppliers  appear  to  be  underrepresented.  There  is  some  difficulty  in  identifying  returns 
agribusiness stocks due to the large number of privately held firms such as Cargill. Furthermore, 
some of the publically traded agribusiness firms have periods of inactivity associated with re-
organization periods. It is also not clear that all firms classified as agribusiness firms would be 
equally  impacted  by  the  changes  in  agricultural  policy.  For  example,  food  retailers  such  as 
Kroger and Marsh Supermarkets are classified as agribusinesses by the SIC codes identified by 
the USDA as part of the agribusiness industry. Another potential improvement to the model to 
consider  is  measuring  the  returns  to  the  stock  beginning  at  a  time  that  corresponds  to  the 
implementation of the legislation rather than the date corresponding to it become law.    9 
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Symbol  Company Name  SIC Code 
10517  RNT  AARON RENTS INC  7359 
14868  ARDNA  ARDEN GROUP INC  5410* 
15472  WWY  WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR CO  2067* 
16126  AZZ  A Z Z INC  3646 
16600  HSY  HERSHEY CO  2064* 
18403  JCP  PENNEY J C CO INC  5311 
18729  CL  COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO  2844 
20618  CRS  CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP  3312 
21573  IP  INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO  2621 
21742  CASY  CASEYS GENERAL STORES INC  5330 
22921  CKP  CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS INC  3669 
25320  CPB  CAMPBELL SOUP CO  2032* 
29938  BF  BROWN FORMAN CORP  2084* 
34367  FARM  FARMER BROTHERS CO  2095* 
39328  GLDC  GOLDEN ENTERPRISES INC  2099* 
39571  GGG  GRACO INC  3561 
42796  MDP  MEREDITH CORP  2721 
44506  IDTI  INTEGRATED DEVICE TECHNOLOGY  3670 
54818  RDK  RUDDICK CORP  5411* 
54973  BCV  BANCROFT FUND LTD  6723 
55984  IHT  INNSUITES HOSPITALITY TRUST  6798 
56696  TAI  TRANSAMERICA INCOME SHS INC  6123 
59184  BUD  ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC  2082* 
59483  YRCW  Y R C WORLDWIDE INC  4213 
59774  LDL  LYDALL INC  3825 
61313  DCI  DONALDSON INC  3564 
61621  PAYX  PAYCHEX INC  8700 
62958  SENEB  SENECA FOODS CORP NEW  2033* 
63715  POWL  POWELL INDUSTRIES INC  3820 
68427  IAF  ABERDEEN AUSTRALIA EQUITY FD INC  6726 
72005  SEH  SPARTECH CORP  3081 
75110  WGNR  WEGENER CORP  3663 
*indicates an agribusiness as classified by the USDA using SIC codes 
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Table 2. Arbitrage Pricing Model Results 
  Full Sample    Before 1996    After 1996 












Constant  0.0012  0.0004    0.0000  0.0011    0.0034  0.0013 
  (0.0021)  (0.0025)    (0.0033)  (0.0036)    (0.0026)  (0.0032) 
Factor 1  0.2132  0.2202    -0.0134  0.0116    0.1484  0.1602 
  (0.0619)  (0.0633)    (0.0590)  (0.0674)    (0.0523)  (0.0533) 
Factor 2  -0.1578  -0.1714    -0.0445  -0.0485    0.1645  0.1860 
  (0.0350)  (0.0405)    (0.0469)  (0.0476)    (0.0947)  (0.0966) 
Factor 3  -0.0721  -0.0551    0.0468  0.0382    0.0547  0.0569 
  (0.0498)  (0.0560)    (0.0553)  (0.0568)    (0.0517)  (0.0516) 
Factor 4  0.2565  0.2649    -0.4009  -0.3961    -0.0179  -0.0322 
  (0.0589)  (0.0607)    (0.0844)  (0.0853)    (0.0495)  (0.0512) 
Factor 5  0.1295  0.1400    -0.0059  -0.0032    0.1511  0.1822 
  (0.0511)  (0.0538)    (0.0438)  (0.0443)    (0.0745)  (0.0798) 
Agribusiness    0.0013      -0.0021      0.0031 
    (0.0019)      (0.0027)      (0.0029) 
 